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Book	Review:	1931:	Debt,	Crisis,	and	the	Rise	of	Hitler
by	Tobias	Straumann
In	1931:	Debt,	Crisis,	and	the	Rise	of	Hitler,	Tobias	Straumann	details	how	the	German	financial	disaster	of	this
momentous	year	not	only	devastated	the	country’s	domestic	economy	but	also	sent	shockwaves	through	the
international	financial	system	and	paved	the	way	for	the	ascent	of	Adolf	Hitler.	In	this	excellent	book,	Straumann
narrates	the	German	story	of	1931	with	clarity	and	authority,	writes	Max	Harris.
1931:	Debt,	Crisis,	and	the	Rise	of	Hitler.	Tobias	Straumann.	Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2019.
Find	this	book:	
1931	was	an	inflection	point	in	history,	a	year	in	which	so	much	of	such
consequence	happened	that,	nearly	a	century	later,	one	still	strains	to	make	sense
of	it	all.	On	19	September	1931,	Japan	invaded	Manchuria,	an	act	of	aggression
that	the	League	of	Nations	opposed	to	no	avail,	thereby	demonstrating	how	little
collective	security	meant.	That	very	same	day,	thousands	of	miles	away	in	London,
the	British	government	decided	to	go	off	the	gold	standard.	After	months	of
expending	enormous	sums	to	stem	the	flight	from	the	pound,	the	British	concluded
that	the	battle	could	not	be	won.	With	this	surrender,	any	remaining	hopes	for	an
international	economy	pivoting	on	the	classical	verities	of	gold	and	free	trade
vanished;	economic	nationalism	became	the	order	of	the	day.
One	reason	speculators	found	sterling	so	ripe	for	prey	was	that	London	had
substantial	sums	invested	in	Germany	that	it	could	not	repatriate.	The	funds	were
held	up	because	Germany	had	experienced	its	own	financial	crisis	that	summer,
and	the	German	government	had	instituted	a	prohibition	on	capital	withdrawals	to
staunch	the	outflow	of	funds.	Indeed,	it	was	the	German	catastrophe	in	July	1931	that	was	perhaps	the	most
consequential	event	of	that	horrible	year.	As	Tobias	Straumann	argues	in	his	excellent	new	book,	1931:	Debt,
Crisis,	and	the	Rise	of	Hitler,	the	disaster	in	Germany	not	only	ravaged	the	domestic	economy	but	also	sent
shockwaves	through	the	international	financial	system	and	paved	the	way	for	Adolf	Hitler’s	ascent.
The	standard	description	of	the	German	crisis	begins	with	the	collapse	of	the	Austrian	banking	system	in	May	1931.
The	troubles	in	Austria	then	infected	Germany	and	brought	down	its	financial	system	in	the	middle	of	July.
However,	Straumann	makes	clear	that	Germany	was	headed	toward	a	crossroads	well	before	then.	The	crisis	was
a	function	of	finance	and	politics,	domestic	and	international.	‘The	fundamental	cause	of	the	German	crisis’,
Straumann	writes,	‘was	the	inability	of	the	parties	to	resolve	the	demands	of	international	agreements	with	those	of
domestic	political	realities’.	The	international	agreements	were	the	reparation	obligations	from	the	First	World	War.
Though	international	conferences	had	progressively	reduced	the	reparations	bill	during	the	1920s,	the	latest
iteration,	the	Young	Plan	(adopted	in	1930),	had	not	created	a	sustainable	payment	schedule.	The	requisite
payments	were	simply	too	great	for	Germany	to	pay,	perhaps	not	during	an	economic	boom	but	certainly	in	the
midst	of	a	downturn	when	relief	spending	was	high	and	tax	receipts	low.	Investors	understood	this	basic	reality	and
were	therefore	increasingly	wary	of	holding	money	in	Germany;	throughout	1930	and	1931,	Germany	faced
continuing	shortfalls	in	government	financing	as	a	result.
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The	German	government,	led	by	Chancellor	Heinrich	Brüning,	implemented	successive	and	unpopular	austerity
measures	as	it	tried	to	gain	control	over	domestic	finances,	partly	to	gather	the	funds	to	pay	reparations	and	partly
to	demonstrate	the	impossibility	of	continuing	to	pay	reparations.	But	the	efforts	were	in	vain.	Money	kept	leaving
Germany.	International	efforts	to	rescue	Germany	were	half-hearted	or	too	late.	In	late	June,	President	Herbert
Hoover	announced	a	one-year	moratorium	on	intergovernmental	debts	as	a	last-ditch	attempt	to	calm	the	situation,
but	the	clumsy	rollout	and	the	prolonged	haggling	over	details	with	the	French	robbed	the	move	of	much	of	its
potential	efficacy.	In	the	middle	of	July,	the	crisis	peaked	and	German	banks	were	on	the	brink	of	collapse.	Seeing
no	other	option,	the	government	declared	a	bank	holiday	and	implemented	capital	controls,	helping	to	put	an	end	to
the	domestic	emergency	but	spreading	havoc	internationally.	The	world	of	finance	reacted	in	horror	and	raced	to
move	funds	invested	around	the	globe	to	safety.	Britain	was	the	first	target,	and	in	just	two	weeks,	it	lost	almost
one-fifth	of	its	gold	and	foreign	exchange	reserves;	the	United	States	soon	thereafter	experienced	an	enormous
outflow	of	gold	and	tightening	of	financial	conditions.	The	world	depression	entered	its	most	vicious	phase:	it	was
now	Great.
Between	1929	and	1932,	real	GDP	in	Germany	plummeted	by	a	quarter,	and	the	unemployment	rate	surpassed	20
per	cent.	In	this	mass	deprivation,	Hitler	found	opportunity.	The	Nazis	did	not	want	a	solution	to	the	depression	or	a
rapprochement	with	the	world:	their	path	to	power	was	hitched	to	a	trail	of	despair.	Already	in	the	autumn	of	1930,
the	Nazis	had	exploited	discontent	with	the	economic	situation	and	reparation	payments	to	catapult	to	become	the
second	largest	party	in	the	Reichstag.	The	crisis	and	its	aftermath	further	aided	their	cause.	The	trajectory	was	not
linear;	in	November	1932,	the	Nazis	actually	suffered	a	setback	in	the	national	elections.	‘At	this	point’,	Straumann
concludes,	‘a	Nazi	dictatorship	was	still	not	inevitable,	but	neither	was	it	accidental	that	Hitler	would	become
Chancellor	soon	thereafter’.	The	depression	provided	fertile	ground	for	the	Nazis	to	assume	control,	though	other
factors—including	the	belief	among	establishment	conservatives	that	they	could	control	Hitler—were	important	in
leading	President	Paul	von	Hindenburg	to	offer	the	Chancellorship	to	Hitler	in	January	1933.	For	a	book	that	has
‘the	Rise	of	Hitler’	in	its	subtitle,	it	is	somewhat	surprising	and	disappointing	that	only	a	few	pages	are	devoted	to
the	events	after	July	1931,	and	the	book	would	benefit	from	further	discussion	of	the	political	impacts	of	the	crisis.
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‘The	German	crisis	is	instructive’,	Straumann	writes,	‘not	because	it	shows	that	politicians	sometimes	fail	to	act
courageously.	That	is	to	be	expected.	Most	of	us	like	to	play	it	safe.	Rather,	it	teaches	us	a	timeless	lesson	about
the	importance	of	getting	international	agreements	right.’	The	nexus	of	reparations	and	war	debts	set	up	by	post-
war	policymakers	was	simply	not	flexible	enough	to	respond	to	reality.	Hemmed	in	by	domestic	political	constraints
and	a	perpetual	tendency	to	believe	an	improvement	in	Germany’s	economy	was	just	around	the	corner,	the
victorious	powers	were	not	bold	enough	to	lead	opinion	toward	a	more	tenable	solution.	We	cannot	assume	that	in
times	of	crisis	authorities	will	be	able	to	make	the	hard	decisions.	The	most	important	work	does	not	happen	during
the	crisis	but	before	it:	setting	in	place	arrangements	that	both	minimise	the	likelihood	of	an	emergency	and
minimise	the	fallout	should	one	occur.	In	this	light,	all	one	can	say	is	how	distressing	it	is	to	witness	the	purposeful
dismantling	today	of	international	agreements	and	institutions	painstakingly	built	to	this	end.
Near	the	end	of	the	book,	Straumann	reminds	us	of	Arnold	Toynbee’s	characterisation	of	1931	as	the	‘annus
terribilis’,	a	time	‘when	men	and	women	all	over	the	world	were	seriously	contemplating	and	frankly	discussing	the
possibility	that	the	Western	system	of	society	might	break	down	and	cease	to	work’.	Straumann	narrates	the
German	story	during	this	year	with	clarity	and	authority,	leading	the	reader	through	the	twists	and	turns,	the	few
moments	of	optimism	and	the	many	days	of	anguish,	all	toward	a	conclusion	that	we	already	know,	yet	hope
against	hope	that	somehow,	in	a	flash	of	inspiration,	the	countries	were	able	to	avoid.	They	did	not.	In	the	end,	after
further	economic	deprivation,	war	and	genocide,	the	Western	system	survived,	but	just	barely	and	at	unimaginable
loss.	Today,	Toynbee’s	reflections	hit	uncomfortably	close	to	home.	One	wonders	with	trepidation	how	historians
will	view	2016.
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Note:	This	article	is	provided	by	our	sister	site,	LSE	Review	of	Books.	It	gives	the	views	of	the	author,	not	the
position	of	EUROPP	–	European	Politics	and	Policy	or	the	London	School	of	Economics.
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